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Abstract
Title of Dissertation : COMPARATIVE STUDY ON PORT PRIVATISATION:
TWO PORTS UNDER PORT AUTHORITY OF THAILAND:
BANGKOK PORT AND LAEM CHABANG PORT CASE
STUDY
Degree

MSc

Due to the financial situation and advice from IMF and the World Bank, the Thai
government has to review its role on economy and seek a suitable way for state
enterprises. Privatisation is one of the ways to be used. The privatisation plan of the
Port Authority of Thailand began several years ago, with the aim to set up a holding
company in 2000. So far, there are many problems: efficiency, finance return,
government policy, legal matters, land ownership, labour relations and supervision.
The paper is composed of five main chapters, excluding the introduction and the
conclusion. Chapter two describes the background of Bangkok Port to give a
general idea of the port. Chapter three gives an overview of the performance and
productivity of BKP and LCP. Chapter four deals with the cause of privatisation
of Thai ports. Chapter five offers the alternative to BKP and LCP to privatisation.
Finally, chapter six indicates a suitable solution.
In the era of globalisation, both national and international pressure forced ports to
cope with the newly emerging trend while a high level of efficiency and
productivity should be sustained. Port privatisation is necessary to attract financed
investors because port development is capital intensive. In addition, the
government can no longer support the finance to ports.
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The question concerning the government is which is the most suitable method
applicable to port privatisation in BKP and LCP. The author attempts to give an
overview of various methods of approaching the problem with suggestions on the
most suitable method to BKP and LCP.
Keyword: Privatisation, Corporatisation, Bangkok Port, Laem Chabang Port, and
Thailand
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Chapter 1
Introduction

The Port Authority of Thailand (PAT) is a public utility state enterprise under the
general supervision of the Ministry of Transport and Communications. It was
established by the Port Authority of Thailand Act B.E.2494 with the objective of
conducting the business pertaining to the port for the interest of the state and the
public. At present, PAT is responsible for two main ports namely Bangkok Port as
river port and Laem Chabang port as deep sea port.
For many years, different characteristics and processes of privatisation in Thailand
were complicated to achieve the government’s goal. The financial crisis and
economic downturn in 1997-1998 including the pressure from external
organisations such as the World Bank and IMF forced the Thai government to
restructure and stabilise the economy. In 1998, the government issued a master
privatisation plan following the agreement with IMF.
According to the plan, privatisation should be used to stimulate economic growth.
Foreign and domestic investments and know-how should be attracted at the same
time as the efficiency in state enterprises should be improved. The objectives of
privatisation to state enterprises are as follow:
1) Free public resources to be allocated more efficiently to high priority
government objectives such as improving health and education
2) Increasing competition in order to provide better value to state enterprise
customers through improved services and price
3) Promoting higher productivity and labour welfare
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4) Reducing public debt and budgetary burdens
5) Preparing for globalisation of trade in services.(Priebjrivat, 1999)

Following the government policy, PAT as one of the state enterprises will also be
privatised. However, there are many alternatives to privatisation: management buy
out, deregulation, licensing, leasing, concession, build operate transfer, build own
operate transfer, and build own operate. The question in mind is which alternative
is suitable and flexible for PAT. The details will be discussed later.

1.2. Methodology
The author has used the following methodology: gathering, organising, analysing,
diagnosing, and summarising the information and given possible solutions based
on the advantages and disadvantages of each solution. The information includes
a) Primary sources of data collected from PAT and related offices in Thailand
b) Secondary sources from permanent and quest lecturers, field trip study,
UNCTAD, magazines, periodical and information through internet.
1.3. Objective
1. To study policy on privatisation of ports under the Port Authority of Thailand
2. To study procedure on privatisation of ports under the Port Authority of Thailand
3. To compare privatisation in Bangkok Port and Laem Chabang Port
4. To analyse the problems of procedure of privatisation
5. To find a possible solution

2

1.4 Limitation
Some information required was limited due to limited time and uncompromising
attitudes of some of the offices to make available to me some of the data and
material.
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Chapter 2
Background of Bangkok Port (BKP)
2.1 Physical
Following to the Ministry of Transports and Communication (1994), it stated that
Bangkok Port has played an important role as the main gateway of the
international trade of Thailand. BKP is located on the left side of Chao
Phraya River about 28 km. from its estuary, and consists of the West Quay
with 8 berths and the East Quay with 10 berths. BKP has 87 wharves in
total on both sides of the river. The main wharves located on the left side
of a distance of 26 to 29 kilometers from the mouth of the river are
operated by the Port Authority of Thailand (PAT). (See Appendix1,2)
The passing channel is 18 km long, minimum 100 meters wide at linear part, also
minimum 250 meters wide at bend, and 8.5 meters in depth of water. The
maximum size of vessels accommodated in BKP is 12,000 to 15,000 DWT, 172
meters in LOA and 8.2 meters in draft at LLW. (See Table 1)
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Table 1: Facilities at BKP
Berth/Dolphin/

Length(Ft)

Buoy

Number

Size of vessel Capacity

of berth

Length/
Draught(ft)

East Quay

5,012

8

565/27

7

300/15

1

West Quay

5,445

10

565/27

10

Klongtoey

4,592

36

565/27

7

5,248

25

565/27

8

5,182

5

450/25

4

300/23

1

Dolphin
Bang Hua Sua
Dolphin
Mooring Buoy at
Sathupradit
Source: Port Authority of Thailand

There are 2 sides with berths in Bangkok Port: East Quay with 8 berths and West
Quay with 10 berth. The area for cargo storage in Customs fence is about
415,912 sq.m. whereas that outside customs fence is about 63,012 sq.m. The
total area for cargo storage is about 478,924 sq.m. The maximum capacity of
Bangkok Port in 1992 was 1,285,009 TEU. Following the government policy,
container traffic through BKP. is limited to 1,000,000 TEU.
Seaports play a vital role for the continued growth of the economy. The type of
transportation has changed to containers and the size of vessels is bigger. BKP is
not able to cope with the increasing demand of import and export of the country
because the capacity of Bangkok Port is for vessels with 800-1000 containers
whereas draught 8.2 metres can not respond the big size vessel. According to an
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article on Port Conditions in Lloyd’s List (1995), it stated “One hundred and five
vessels in port and 25 vessels waiting at outer anchorage with berthing delay
expected.” Traffic congestion in Bangkok Metropolitan area is another reason for
creating the necessity to have further ports in the Eastern Seaboard area. Laem
Chabang Port is designed to act as a catalyst for the development in Eastern
Seaboard area and to lessen the congestion in BKP and the Bangkok Urban area.
2.2 Economics
a) Vessel service
Table 2 The call of vessel following to type of vessel at BKP 1986-1997
Unit: Calls
Fiscal

General

General cargo

year

cargo vessel vessel &

Container

Total

Growth %

vessel

Container
1986

556

349

814

1,719

-

1987

529

387

891

1,807

5,1193

1988

585

312

1,175

2,072

14,6652

1989

545

227

1,431

2,203

6,3224

1990

608

230

1,480

2,318

5,2202

1991

713

219

1,463

2,395

3,3218

1992

699

204

1,614

2,517

5,0939

1993

587

175

1,720

2,482

-1,3905

1994

579

152

1,818

2,549

2,6994

1995

744

185

1,650

2,579

1,1769

1996

679

122

1,540

2,341

-9,2284

1997

677

123

1,615

2,415

3,1610

Source: Technical & Planning Department, PAT.
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Figure 1 Vessel service

Following the performance to serve vessels at BKP, it showed that calls of
vessels to BKP have increased every year. Especially in 1988 the growth rate of
calls of vessels to BKP was about 14%. According to table 2 calls of vessels from
1986-1997, it showed that the growth rate of calls of vessels to BKP decreased
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with negative percentage in 1992 because of the inauguration of Laem Chabang
Port (LCP) in 1991 (See Appendix 3,4) including limitation of containers
through BKP following the government policy. Simultaneously, more incentives
for port users to use LCP have been taken; therefore, calls of vessels to BKP have
decreased.
b) Goods service
Table 3. Statistics of import goods through BKP in 1990-1997
Unit: Tons
Fiscal Year

Import goods
General Cargo

Container

Total

1990

3,920,120

3,917,392

7,837,512

1991

3,812,237

4,373,538

8,185,775

4.44354

1992

3,386,756

4,594,466

7,981,156

-2.49969

1993

3,597,563

5,102,994

8,700,557

9.013744

1994

3,468,527

5,109,966

8,578,487

-1.40301

1995

3,847,585

6,032,614

9,880,199

15.17414

1996

3,525,174

5,589,287

9,114,461

-7.75023

1997

3,281,823

4,722,382

8,004,205

-12.1813

Source: Technical & Planning Department, PAT.
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Figure 2 Import goods through BKP
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1995
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Table 4 Statistics of export goods through BKP in 1990-1997
Export goods

Fiscal
Year

General Cargo

Container

Total

Growth %

1990

202,048

5,794,783

5,996,831

1991

20,239

7,766,033

7,786,272

29.83978

1992

-

8,163,408

8,163,408

4.843602

1993

-

8,168,230

8,168,230

0.059068

1994

-

8,227,483

8,227,483

0.725408

1995

-

8,276,689

8,276,689

0.598069

1996

-

7,851,146

7,851,146

-5.14646

1997

-

6,696,833

6,696,833

-14.7025

Source: Technical & Planning Department PAT
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Figure 3 Export goods through BKP

11

1996
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Following table3 and 4, the quantity of goods through BKP in 1990-1997
increased continuously but decreased from 1996-1997. Simultaneously, the
growth of import and export cargoes through BKP outstandingly decreased in
1996-1997. The quantity of import and export cargoes decreased about 12.8%
and 14.7% respectively. This showed that the government has managed the
effects of limitation of containers through BKP so as to promote LCP.

BKP plays an important role in international sea trade in Thailand. Table 3 shows
the annual throughput of BKP wharves during 1990-1997. Both export and
import goods increased rapidly. The rapid increase of container cargo in the past
led to severe congestion at BKP. PAT implemented the policies to reduce the
BKP congestion by controlling the container volume passing through BKP not
more than 1,000,000 TEU per year from 1994 and encouraging more traffic at
Laem Chabang port (LCP).
2.3 Disadvantage of BKP
BKP was the main port of Thailand for more than 50 years and has developed
along with national economics and social development. The location of BKP is
on Chaophraya river where there is a draught limitation for vessel over 12,000
GRT. and 172 meters in length. BKP situated in the capital city serves port and
provides anchorage and dolphin services. The problems of BKP are as follows:
1. The major factor that contributes to the port inefficiency is the stuffing and
unstuffing of boxes inside the port. Following an article, Trying Times, in
Lloyd’s List Maritime Asia (1996) stated “This is the traditional patterns of
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factories which are located near the port area and users consider port as if port
was their own backyard.”
2. The lack of a closing time for exports box. Some goods were sent to the port
area when the vessel was going to arrive or the vessel had already arrived.
This led to traffic jam in the port area.
3. The process of EDI installation at Bangkok Port has made very little progress
since there is on line connection with the Customs Department.
4. BKP remains government controlled with a staff of over 5,000 employees.
An article ,PAT Solution, in Port Development International (1995) stated the
following
Payoongkich Chivamit, Managing Director of Bangkok Port, walks
past one of a long row of desks in the Port Authority of Thailand’s
hectic office in Bangkok. Sitting at it is a port employee reading a
copy of Cosmopolitan magazine, with nothing else on his desk.
Chivamit passes without commenting, but he is well aware of the
company’s massive overstaffing problems. The days of the PAT as
an enormous employment-creating benefactor have to draw to a
close if it is to be competitive
In addition, 22 out of 34 people who drive cargo handling equipment are about
45-58 years old which led to decreased efficiency.
5. Face- to -face contact between port employees and port users lead to
tea money (corruption). According to the article, Kick Back Bid Fails, in Port
Development International (1999) it stated that
Shipping companies’ agent cannot assure that each crane will
handle container as much as it can without paying kickback to
port employees. Bangkok Shipowners and Agents Association
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(BSAA) said that we can’t risk our cargo which is worth several
hundred thousand baht for just a few hundred baht.
6. The area of BKP is limited; therefore, it can not expand to cope with the
increasing demand of port users. In addition, the area in BKP has been
allocated for more than 60 offices of shipping company and port offices led to
congestion in BKP. According to an article, Thai Up and Move, in Port
Development International (1996) it stated
Now the Port Authority of Thailand itself has been forced out of the
area as it plans a new office building outside of the port gates. A 19storey, 493million baht (approximately USD 20 million) building is
the PAT’s solution to its space problems.
7. BKP is located in the capital city.

The more port users there are, the

more traffic jams around port area in rush hours. Lorries will not be
allowed to run in rush hours (7-9am and 4-7pm)
8. The growth rate of international trade has increased continuously, but this
does not get along with the limited area in BKP and the capacity of BKP for
cargo transportation is not compatible.
9. Red tape of the bureaucratic system. For example, the checking procedure
before taking goods out of port area by customs has been taken more time and
faced many difficulties.
10. The container berths are not sufficiently deep and the shallow channel to
Klong Toey wharves limit the navigation of large size container ship.
11. The location of Bangkok Port does not fit big vessels. An article, Bangkok
Seeks new Solution to Port Congestion, in Lloyd’s list (1993), it stated
Being a river port BKK cannot accommodate large container ships and
had to rely on transshipment through the ports of neighbor countries with
the consequent cost disadvantage. This in turn has reduced the
competitiveness of exports.”
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2.4 PAT Management and Operation
Although PAT has created financial profit for a long time, this profit can not be
used as a good indicator of efficiency because BKP has enjoyed a monopoly.
The following conclusion of performance is based on the analysis of the actual
management and operation system of PAT in the Effective Port Management and
Operation System (EPMOS) study’s Final Report.

According to Japan

International Co-operation Agency (JICA) study (1988) it stated
Considering the operation of container handling at Klong Toey wharves,
the total throughput in the past, as table 3, shows a considerable success
of operations. However, when the actual operational performance was
examined, there are many problems. Efficiency of cargo handling
equipment use does not maximize. The availability of equipment is about
70-90% whereas the utilization of equipment is about 25-60%.”

The operational system in BKP was summarized in table 5 to show that each
body actually conducts each operation. The major problems of container
handling in BKP are the lack of a total control system of vehicle traffic flow
within the port area, including the shortage of equipment and skilled workers for
container handling.
Table 5. Operational system in BKP.
Job
Ship

Assignment ,permission and

Mark
A

Remark
Assignment is arranged at

confirmation of using berth

berth meeting every morning,

facilities

but less leadership of PAT
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Pilotage /navigation control

D

Harbor Department

Tug boat

B

Arrange of shipping company

Rope boat

B

By order of pilot

Stevedoring

C

Private sector, subject to
registration with PAT.

Cargo

Long-shoring

A

Direct operation

by

Conventional

Shed operator

A

labor and equipment

Tally /Delivery

A

Lighter

C

PAT

Acknowledged by PAT and
permitted by Customs

Container

Marshalling

B/C

Obliged to use PAT labor and
equipment.

Private

sector

widely acting in case of
shortage
Stacking

B/C

Stuffing for export

B/C

Unstuffing for import

A

Conducted

by

PAT

and

Inspected by Customs
Allocation of CY

A

On application of shipping
company

Common

Storage of Cargo

A/C

On

request

except

CY

of

consignee

watched

shipping company
Road traffic

A

Insufficient controlled

Gate check

A

With customs officials

Custom inspection

D

Quarantine/Immigration

D

Carry-in/out

C/D

Source: Bangkok Port
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ETO and private company

by

Abbreviation in Table 5
A: Management/Operation by PAT directly
B: PAT’s services but executed by groups other than PAT
C: Private sector’s service allowed by PAT actually
D: Service by other public agencies

The above mentioned problems arise from a single reason: the disadvantage of
monopolist, BKP has been the only one port to accommodate maritime trade and
protected by law, particularly for import trade.

When considering the area

around Bangkok, most shippers, consignees and shipping companies may not
have had another choice other than to use BKP. On the other hand, PAT has been
required to produce a profit to contribute to the national finance and to pay
bonuses.
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Chapter 3
Performance and Productivity of PAT and LCP
Port performance indicators are useful because they will help to measure
port performance, identify the problems and seek for suitable solutions. To
compare the actual port performance with the target of the port is important of
port performance. In addition, port performance will show the trend of the port
that is related to its performance. Professor Francou (2000) stated the following:
In spite of the fact that more and more ports all over the world have
engaged a process of privatization, the port authority is still involved in the
control of the efficiency because the survival of the port in a competitive
market or the economy of the country in case of monopoly, are determined
by the efficiency.
According to Professor Shuo Ma (2000)
Efficiency often means speed and reliability of port services. From a
survey made by a big intermodal transport operator/shipping line APC of
its shippers, as shown in a table, one can observe that transport efficiency
described as “on line delivery” is the first concern of shippers, who are at
the same time directly or indirectly port users.
Priority

Item

1

On-time delivery

2

Overall responsiveness

3

Price

4

On-time pickup

5

Transit time
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Priority

Item

6

Service Territory

7

Billing accuracy

8

Correct equipment

9

Degree of control

10

Claims processing

To measure the efficiency of the port, the performance indicators such as
turnaround time, berth occupancy, handling productivity, efficiency of handling
equipment, expense of operations, tugboat productivity and channel use should be
analyzed to show the problem of PAT.
Table 6 Port Performance
Performance
List

Unit

1996

1997

1998

a. Waiting time

Hour/call

4.43

4.74

2.62

b. Turnaround time

Hour/call

32.24

24.90

22.16

c. Working time

Hour/call

22.81

19.26

17.83

73.91

63.53

60.06

Berth at BKP
1. Container vessel

d. Berth occupancy

%

2. General cargo vessel
a)waiting time

Hour/call

6.71

2.46

0.97

b)Turnaround time

Hour/call

77.26

66.64

63.50

c)Working time

Hour/call

49.46

36.88

42.65

75.28

63.07

44.16

d)Berth occupancy

%

Source: Technical and Planning Department, PAT
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3.1 Container vessel
3.1.1 Turnaround time
Ship turnaround time is one of the basic measurements of port
performance whether a port will survive or not is up to the customers’
satisfaction namely ship-owner. The shorter ship turnaround time is, the more
benefits the ship owners get. “According to several studies, it is admitted 2/3 of
the total maximum cost take place in the ports, mainly wharfage, handling and
storage operation.” (Francou, 1999) In addition, ship turnaround time will be
calculated by shipping companies or ship-owners to see the port efficiency and
sail schedule for the vessel. “Ship Turnaround time gives an excellent indication
of the speed of service being provided to ship operators; it is a very important
element in determining maritime transport cost.” (The United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development, 1992). Professor Francou (2000) stated
In deed, the comparison of the waiting time with the service time
gives a good information about what is acceptable by shipowners; they usually accept a 10% rate; beyond this rate, they
consider the port as a low quality one.
The expected turnaround time by PAT was about 24 hours/call whereas the
performance was 22.16 hours/call. There are two reasons why the ship
turnaround time decreased. First, the government policy is to evaluate the
performance of each state enterprise and set each one in different levels such as
excellent, good, fair and poor. This will affect the incentive such as salary
increase, bonus etc. to state enterprises. Secondly, PAT allocated the area of the
East Quay to be terminal 1 and 2 for container vessels.

This showed it was

better than expected. In 1998, there were about 1,741 container vessel calls and
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goods about 1,113,756 T.E.U., therefore the average was 639 containers per call.
The performance of turnaround time at LCP operated by PAT was 16.44
hours/calls of container vessels and the average was 538 containers per call. The
performance of turnaround time at LCP operated by private companies was 1820 hours/calls of container vessels and the average was 540 containers per call.
Following the evaluation of the Ministry of Finance, the average time per
container at LCP should be about 3 minutes.
The different containers between BKP and LCP were about 100 containers and
times by 3; therefore, it was about 5 hours. In summary, the time operated by
PAT and private companies at LCP was about 21.44 and 23-25 hours
respectively. When the turnaround time of BKP, LCP operated by PAT and
private companies was compared, they were quite the same. However, the weak
point of BKP is that it is a river port therefore the tide is an important factor.
3.1.2 Berth occupancy
Berth occupancy is one of the indicators to show port performance. It not only
gives the actual intensity of berth use but also indicates the level of demand of
service. In theory, berth occupancy rate with several berths is calculated with 60%
so that waiting time will be minimized and cargo handling will be proper without
congestion traffic and spare capacity for traffic peaks will be guaranteed. In case
of special conditions (competition, schedule etc) the berth occupancy rate should
be between 40-50%. “High berth occupancy does not indicate an efficiently run
berth. Low berth occupancy indicates under use of resources.” (The United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 1992)
The expected berth occupancy by PAT was about 65% whereas the performance
was about 60.06%. This showed it was lower than expected because few
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container vessels berthed at BKP therefore the berth will be not maximizing
used.
3.2 General cargo vessel
3.2.1 Turnaround time. The expected turnaround time by PAT was about 66
hours/call whereas the performance was 63.50 hours/call. This decreased because
the economic crisis occurred in Asia and transportation changed from
conventional cargo to container. This showed it was better than expected.
3.2.2 Berth occupancy. The expected berth occupancy by PAT was about 65%
whereas the performance was about 64.16%. This showed it was lower than
expected because few vessels berthed at BKP and the transportation was changed
from conventional cargo to container; therefore, the berth will be not be used to a
maximum. The berth occupancy was 44.16%. It showed the vessels would berth
13 days and the berth will be empty for 18 days monthly.
The vessels stayed for a long time at the port unnecessarily when compared with
efficient ports in the world such as Le Havre in France, and the Port of
Rotterdam, the Netherlands where the minimum turnaround time of vessel was 6
hours. Although most efficient ports are in the developed countries, PAT should
try to increase the efficiency in the era of the globalization. In view of the berth
occupancy, the most efficient ports are from 40-50%, which is contrary to PAT.
3.3 Handling productivity
Handling productivity is another indicator to show the port productivity. A lot of
factors such as type of cargo, people employed and their skills, type of ship and
equipment should be analyzed.
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Table 7 Handling Productivity
List

Unit

1997

1998

Handling
Productivity
BKP
a)Container vessel

Container/crane/

17.01

19.01

Ton/hour

42.34

53.50

Container/crane/

25

26

Hour
b)General

cargo

vessel
LCP operated by
private company
Container vessel

Hour
Source: Bangkok Port

Following Table 7, the efficiency in cargo handling at BKP was quite low;
however, the improvement of the handling efficiency of containers was from 17
to 19 containers/crane/hour in 1998, whereas that of the efficiency of general
cargo was from 42 to 53 tons in 1998. On the other hand, the handling
productivity of LCP operated by private companies was from 25 to 26
containers/crane/hour. This was the weak point of BKP in competition. Besides,
unskilled and old workers including traffic conditions are also an obstacle in the
handling productivity.
3.4 The efficiency of Handling Equipment
Equipment is available to berth operators when needed and it should be properly
operated so as to bring about efficiency. Low availability and excess downtime
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show poor utilization of the equipment. High availability but low utilization
shows under use of equipment. Horck (2000) stated
An overall utilisation value for all machines of a particular type and
capacity would be a more practice measure. The advantage is that it gives
an idea of the overall level of demand for a specific class of equipment.
Equipment availability is a measure of the proportion of time individual
machines or classes of machines are accessible to berth operators.
Table 8 Efficiency of handling equipment use
List
Rail Mounted Shore Side

Availability

Utilization

90.70

59.20

Yard gantry Crane

94.82

69.94

Mobile Crane

93.94

24.59

Top Loader

64.95

43.70

Fork Lift Truck for Hiring

92

25.21

Fork Lift Truck for Services

86.23

64.72

Tractors for Chassis

70.52

51.03

Gantry crane

Source: Bangkok port
According to Table 8, the handling equipment was not used to a maximum. The
availability of equipment was about 70-90% whereas the utilization of equipment
was about 25-60%. This may be because the cargoes through BKP decreased
owing to the economic crisis and private companies used their own berths.
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3.5 The expense of operation
The expense of port operations is very important because it reflects the cost of
production. If the expense of port operation is high, it is difficult to go on doing
business in the highly competitive market.
Table 9 Expense of operation/Ton
List

BKP

LCP

Operation expense(baht)

2,799,246

1,719,188

Amount of cargo(ton)

13,365,736

13,889,933

Operation expense/

209.434

123.815

Amount of cargo
Source: BKP and LCP

Table 9 shows the expense of operations including vessels, cargo, service and
administration expenses per ton at BKP was about 209 baht/ton whereas that at
LCP was about 123 baht/ton. The expense at LCP is lower than that at BKP
about 1 time because the expense for dredging in BKP as a river port is very
high. The high operation expense/ton at BKP led to the high cost of production
and the disadvantage of competition.
3.6 Tugboat productivity
Tugboats push, pull and move ships to shore where the quay or dock is shallow
or small. Tugboats are one of the services that PAT provides to vessels.
The investment for tugboats is quite high whereas the price of this service is
controlled by the government.
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Table 10 Comparison of tugboats operations
List

1995

1996

1997

1998

Number

13

13

13

11

Utilize

13

13

13

11

Total

29,931

18,127

16,084

13,061

191

116

103

99

100%

60%

54%

52%

of Tugboat

Working hour
Average
of working hour/
tugboat/month
Compare %
With 1995
Source: Harbor Department, PAT

Table 11 Income and expense of tugboat
Unit: Million baht
Income/expense

1996

1997

1998

23.25

24.32

30.24

28.15

29.89

20.73

To Private berth

70.99

26.29

14.32

Total income

122.40

80.51

65.31

123.67

163.18

146.50

Tugboat income
To BKP
(container vessel)
To BKP
(General
cargo vessel)

Tugboat expense
Operation expense
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Profit(loss)

(1.27)

(82.67)

(81.20)

Source: Comptroller Department, PAT
Following Table 10, the utilization of 11 tugboats at BKP was only 50% in 19971998 because BKP’s tugboats were replaced by private tugboats at the private
berths following the government policy. In addition, the income from tugboats
continuously decreased from 1996-1998 from 122.4, 80.5 to 65.3 million baht
respectively.

This led to a continuous loss in 1996-1998 from 1.27, 82.67 to

81.2 million baht.

Furthermore, the cargo through BKP decreased and the

income from tugboats to serve private berths also decreased in 1996-1998 from
71.0, 26.3 to 14.3 million baht respectively. This decrease was about 80% within
2-3 years. (See table 11) On the contrary, tugboat expenses such as salary,
depreciation and maintenance still increased.
3.7 Vessel through channel and berth
One of the PAT duties is “to conduct dredging operation and maintenance of the
bar channels, installing navigation aids and other related facilities.” (PAT, 1998)
The number of vessels through the channel affected the income.
Table 12 Statistics of Vessels through channel and berth
1996

1997

1998

Vessel

Calls

%

Calls

%

Calls

%

Bunker

11,559

60

11,543

55

9,873

54

Cargo&
Passenger
vessel

27

Berth

3,047

21

3,099

25

2,858

25

2,875

19

2,371

20

2,331

21

at BKP
Berth
at

Private

berth
Source: Bangkok Port

Table 13 The performance of the Marine Department
Unit: million baht
Income/expense

1996

1997

1998

294.9

368.9

340.3

-other income

2.5

13.6

0.4

Total Income

297.4

382.5

340.7

319.2

321

304.2

43.5

42

41

Total expense

362.7

363

345.2

Profit(loss)

(65.3)

19.5

(4.5)

96.5

110

92.6

Income
-Port dues

Expense
-Operation
-Administration

Unit cost of dredging

Source: Comptroller Department, PAT

Table13 shows the unit cost of dredging by PAT in 1998 was about 92.6
baht/cum. whereas that by the private companies was about 70-80 baht/cum.
Besides, the payback from the dredging for PAT was not good when comparing
the investment with the income.

The payback was only 1.3% due to the
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decreasing number of vessels through the channel. (See table 12) The income
from port dues decreased to about 28.6 million baht or about 7.8% whereas the
profit decreased about 15 million baht or about 77%.
3.8 General condition
3.8.1 Finance
Some permanent assets such as land which were distributed by the landowner to
PAT as a state enterprise were used for the performance to bring about the
income. However, these assets were not calculated for depreciation as the
expense in the balance sheet. In addition, the delayed performance following the
project will affect state enterprises because the loan from foreign bank has to pay
the fee and interest. A lot of money from the PAT income was deposited in the
current account in the bank but did not bring about much interest as should have
been the case. In addition, some port workers were paid overtime which was
more than the monthly salary even though they did not work after office hours.
The comptroller department (1998) stated “ One of the monthly high expenses
for PAT is overtime paid to port workers.”
3.8.2 Resource management
The list of the general store is not correct because officers lack knowledge and
skills to record the list such as oil was stolen for personal use. The port training
was set following to yearly budget whereas port workers had few chances to use
it. For example, port workers were trained about computers at computer school
but they rarely used computers at the office since the number of personal
computers at office was limited and some senior officers worried port workers
would use it for personal purposes.

One port worker (1999) stated “ I have

already forgotten how to use a computer because I never use it after I finished
studying it at computer school.”
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3.8.3 Administration
The National Economic and Social Development Board (1984) stated
The inefficiencies of state enterprises to their lack of operating
flexibility and slow decision on investment and expenditure
resulting from too much supervision by too many government
agencies, including the Ministry of Finance, the Budget Bureau,
and the National Economic and Social Development Board.
In addition, the executives and managers of many state enterprises were political
appointees or government bureaucrats with little experience in business. The
boards of directors were filled with retired military leaders, high-ranking
bureaucrats, and politicians who used their positions to obtain jobs for relatives
and friends. Employees of smaller and less efficient state enterprises demanded
salaries equal to the wages of workers in larger and more productive state
enterprises. Political intervention resulted in overstaffing and high costs.
3.8.4 Fringe benefit
Priebjrivat (1999) stated “ Although salaries were somewhat lower than in
private companies, fringe benefit were higher in PAT.”

PAT employees

received at least two-month salary bonuses if they used their leave vacation from
7 to15 days per year. Some technical employees took second jobs in the private
sector while still employed at PAT. Many workers took lunch breaks that lasted
from long before noon to late afternoon. PAT employed over 6,000 people, with
many departments seriously overstaffed because larger divisions could obtain
higher budgets, greater internal political power and more prestige based on their
size.
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Chapter 4
The Privatisation of Thai Ports

Privatisation is to increase the role of the private sector in the activities that the
government used to manage so as to decrease the role of the government in the
economic activities. In addition, privatisation is to deregulate the regulations that
are obstacles for the initiation so that a good climate for competition will be
promoted. This will lead producers to develop the products and services
continuously so as to respond to customers’ needs.
Royal Thai Government (1998) stated
The government defined privatisation as any measures that increases
private sector participation in sectors where government enterprises
presently operate, including divestiture of the state enterprises or assets
(ownership transfer), concession arrangement, joint ventures, management
contracts, leasing, outsourcing, contracting services, deregulation which
increases competition, creation of needed regulatory bodies, and
introduction of new competition.
Professor Ma (2000) stated
Port privatisation is another exam. All success stories in the world ports
are different from one another. It is hardly to induce any rules and models
in this respect, because the question falls in the sphere of nonprogrammable management. There can be only innovative solutions tailormade for each particular situation. All attempts to copy a model of one
port to another port have proved to be unfruitful, if not harmful. A right
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approach of discussing such complex problem is probably to explain the
general principles and then go through various real case studies to let the
students themselves to seize an inspiration from the cases. Nonprogrammable management can only be ‘learnt’ indirectly. By discussing
the experience of success or failure cases, one’s own experience could be
enriched, which becomes the source of his artistic quality.
Like other countries, the government of Thailand aims to improve the economic
and social well-being of the country and its people and in its drive to attain this
objective, numerous state enterprises have started to occupy important positions
and to play a vital role in the development of the Thai economy. It is imperative,
therefore, that the objective of raising living standard be achieved if the
efficiency of state enterprises is improved. To fail to do so would mean that state
enterprises would drain the valuable economic resources of the country. To raise
the efficiency, the Thai government is convinced that privatisation is an
important policy instrument. PAT, like other state enterprises, is under the
infrastructure of the privatisation program.
4.1 The various reasons for PAT privatisation are as follows:
4.1.1 Government Stability
The first reason is that the government would like to minimally stabilize if the
total external debt of state enterprises could not be reduced. Although state
enterprises such as PAT yielded a net surplus, there still existed an enormous
investment, which means that internally generated fund of PAT is not sufficient to
finance the investment program.

This gap therefore has to be filled by loans

especially loans from external sources. PAT (1996) stated
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The Thai Government commissioned the Netherlands Engineering
Consultants (NEDECO) to conduct a feasibility study on developing a new
deep sea port. The project’s feasibility study was reviewed and updated
from time to time according to the change in circumstances. In 1982, the
Government decided that this port should be developed and opened for
operation by 1990. A loan from the Overseas Economics Co-operation
Fund (OECF) of Japan was granted in 1983 to support this project (70%
from OECF, 30% from local currency). The construction of the port
started in December 1967.
This led to the accumulation of external debt. Ingavatana (1989) stated “In 1980,
for example, the proportion of state enterprise investment financed from internally
generated funds dropped to as low as 17 per cent although this was improved to
29 per cent during 1982-1983.”

During the latter period, the proportion of

investment of state enterprises financed from budgetary allocations dropped from
10 to 15 percent. This drop in the proportion on investment finances from
internally generated savings and budgetary allocations consequently led to
increasing reliance debt financing especially foreign borrowing.

Ingavatana

(1989) stated “By early 1985, the total outstanding foreign debt of all state
enterprises was about USD 5 billion, which amount to about half of Thailand’s
public sector foreign debt.”
4.1.2 Efficiency
To increase the efficiency of state enterprises like PAT in Thailand is the second
major reason. Royal Thai Government (1998) stated the following:
Although some of Thailand’s 59 state enterprises returned surplus to the
government, the master plan noted that many had “monopoly or quasi-
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monopoly powers, require substantial capital investments or operating
subsidies and due to their dominance in each sector, inhibit open and free
competition.
Although state enterprises like PAT made a profit, this financial profitability
could not be taken as a good indicator of efficiency. This is because the above
financial profitability had been due to a monopolistic market structure in which
some of the state enterprises operated and discriminated in favor of state
enterprises when it comes to the award of contract. This can be seen in the case of
PAT circumstances. In the past, state enterprises had been given the preference
over others when it came to competitive bidding for contract by the state even
when their prices were higher than their competitors. These practices hardly
encouraged efficiency, especially when they were less competitive.

The

government realized this and took steps to improve efficiency by exposing state
enterprises to real market competition without any favors given to them, to cooperate with the private sector managers to help in running state enterprise
following the corporate culture so that these state enterprises will be more
responsive to market signals and to lessen political interference in the
management of state enterprises. The efficiency at the port was already analyzed
in chapter two. Bert Kruk, Director of TEMPO, Port of Rotterdam (2000) stated
Port privatisation will increase the port efficiency, service attitude and
competitiveness, decrease the cost, improve the market and port user
responsiveness, obtain the access to the new technology and increase the
competitive position. In view of administrative, privatisation will decrease
the political influence, reduce the bureaucracy in the port administration,
obtain more efficient organization, utilize the foreign managerial
experience and improve managerial skills.
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4.1.3 Securities Exchange of Thailand
Privatisation is to be engaged with a view of deepening and strengthening the
Securities Exchange of Thailand.

Privatisation can raise the funds for the

economic regeneration and attract both national and international capital into the
country. This will be collection of capital from the private sector. However, the
value of shares and the interest of private to invest in the port are up to the port
performance. If the performance of the port is good, many people will be
interested in investment and money will be used for other projects. On the other
hand, if the performance of the port is not good, few people will be interested in
investment; therefore, it is difficult for the port to run another project.

In

addition, it will promote a good climate for investment. Priebjrivat (1999) stated
State Enterprise such as Port Authority of Thailand (PAT) would
transform themselves into holding companies, setting up subsidiaries to
run the operation under the control and to float their shares on the stock
exchange. PAT privatised part of their operations by giving concessions
to private organisations to manage their facilities or to provide services.
PAT provided a 25-year concession to a private company to run its
operations at Laem Chabang Port.
In addition, Bert Kruk (2000) stated “Port privatisation will lead to raise the
capital, reduce the public expenditure, reduce the commercial risks in investment,
improve the utilization of existing capacity-less need to invest in new
infrastructure and superstructure and broaden the ownership of port assets.”
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4.1.4 International Loan Agency
The pressure from the international loan agencies such as the World Bank may
also influence the Thai government to embark upon privatisation and
deregulation. World Bank (1997) stated
The World Bank emphasises that privatising state enterprises and
allowing the private sector to participate more freely in sectors of the
economy controlled or dominated by the state can free up public
resources for higher priority activities, make it possible for services to be
delivered better and at lower cost, and create new opportunities for
private sector development.
In the period of the Asian crisis, the government sought a 17.2 billion USD loan
from the IMF through the privatisation plan to address growing constraints in its
ability to subsidise state enterprises, reduce its debt burden, and restore investors’
confidence in the Thai economy. A loan of USD 4 billion through a stand-by
arrangement for the macro economic adjustment was provided by IMF.
Following an article on PAT: Long and winning road to Privatisation in Port and
Harbour (1998) stated “ Parliamentary committee is a considering privatisation
of state enterprise to improve efficiency and tackle with the country’s economic
crisis.” Priebjrivat (1999) stated “ The IMF contends that privatisation can
improve the long-run growth rate or output level of the economy, generate public
revenues to reduce public debt and government deficits, and enhance the value of
enterprise assets.” Priebjrivat (1999) stated “The Royal Thai Government issued
a Master Plan for State Enterprise Sector Reform in 1998 as part of Thailand’s
agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to restructure the
country’s economy.”
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Under continuing pressure from the International Monetary Fund and the World
Bank, the Thai government announced a new privatisation strategy in the fourth
IMF letter of intent in May 1998.
The above strategies are as follows:
a) Free public resources to be allocated more efficiently to high priority
government objectives such as improving health and education.
b) Increasing competition in order to provide better value to state enterprise
customers through improved services and prices
c) Promoting higher productivity and labor welfare
d) Reducing public debt and budgetary burdens
e) Preparing for globalization of trade in services.
These strategies were managed quickly following the condition and time of IMF.
Therefore, some points such as consumer protection may not be considered
carefully and clearly.
4.1.5 Government’s Burden
The losses of state enterprises seemed to be government’s burden for a long time.
The deterioration of government reserves, growing expenditure budgets, the
decrease of international reserves, the growing public debt and others brought in
the concept of privatisation. NESDB (1981) stated
State enterprises were slow to grow, that their value-added in
the industrial sector had been only about 4 percent, many were
loss-making and required subsidies from the government rather
than generating revenues, and most had high per-unit costs of
production and low rates of return. The lack of competition in
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many sectors hindered the introduction of new products and
services and the expansion of services coverage. Low overall rates
of return made state enterprise unreliable instruments for price
stabilisation or public revenue generation.
The subsidy from the government to state enterprises came from the income tax;
therefore, it may say that the losses of state enterprises are the burden of people
who paid taxes.
4.1.6 Employment
Table 14 Number and Position of employees in PAT
Position

Number

Director General

1

Deputy Director General

4

Assistant Director General

3

Director of Department

14

Deputy Director of Department

23

Director of Division

86

Deputy Director of Division

96

Chief of Section

300

Assistant chief of Section

242

Chief of Unit

531

General Administrative officer

1,391

Clerk

3,446

Assistant to mechanic officer

267

General worker

331

Source : PAT Annual Report, 1996
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Following the table 14, it shows that a number of employees in PAT are clerk and
also shows the imbalance between number of worker and work. This is the
overstaff problem. Following the study by Japan International Cooperation
Agency (JICA), the number of suitable employees should be 3000. With regard to
employment, privatisation will reduce the public labor force on administration,
and operation, reduce or eliminate the restrictive labor practices or labor union as
it used to be. Lloyd’s List (1995) stated “ Port workers have been blocking the
main entrance to Bangkok Port since about 1800 local time, only the entrance to
East Quay is presently accessible. The strike is causing congestion in the port.”
The article on Developing Ports in Lloyd’s list (1998) stated
Even though the new company will not employ all the same staff, we
think privatisation will be good for our employees, said Mr. Payoongkich,
because they will have increased income. And with our new port
improvement in place, we feel we are in a good position to adjust easily
when a new company is formed under the terms of privatisation.
It may say that privatisation will increase the private sector employment whereas
the ‘hire’ and ‘fire’ by performance will be introduced.
4.1.7 Concept of Port
Robert Cooper (1998) stated “ Port can not rely on a former concept of “ build it
and they will come,” or even the less realistic concept of “build it and they will
never leave.” PAT has to realise that to achieve the goal by market mechanism is
better than under the umbrella of state control. If PAT would like to survive and
prosper, PAT has to adapt to changing world. In the era of globalisation, there is
no boundary of investment and business led to high competition; therefore, the
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efficiency and adaptation of port play an important role on the ability of the
country to compete.
4.1.8 Management skills
Professional management skills and techniques by the new partners from both
local and abroad will be introduced through privatisation. The motivation and
incentive to improve the performance including risk taking in the business will be
provided to the management and staff. Port workers should know the philosophy
of business management and change the way of work. The former pattern of port
work did not get along with the present situation. Management techniques from
privatisation will help to improve the port performance so as to survive and
compete with other ports.
4.1.9 Modern Technology
Modern technology such as computer or other equipment will become available
and used efficiently by the private sector. This can not happen in state enterprises
because the procurement system of state enterprises was quite slow and
sometimes faced red tape. For example, the model and computer programs used
by PAT in 1997 was already used by the private sector in 1995 whereas the
model and computer programs used by private sector in 1997 was more modern
and more advanced technologically than the ones used by PAT. The time for
procurement in the private sector was about 1-7 days whereas the procurement
for PAT was more than 3 months. Changes in technologies have affected the
structure and competitiveness of the port. The industry has moved from one in
which dominantly public capital was used to provide common user facilities to
one in which more private capital has been used to provide terminals which are
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designed to serve the logistics requirement of more narrowly defined groups of
shippers. The efficiency of port cargo handling and inland transportation services
has also increased so greatly that the geographical monopoly power once enjoyed
by ports has been eroded greatly. The routeing alternatives for the majority of
shippers have increased over time. In the port industry, developments along with
the provision of more specialised facilities have had the somewhat preserves
corollary of increasing the effectiveness of competition in the industry.
4.1.10 Collapse of communism countries
The collapse of the economies in communist country such as the Soviet, West
Germany showed that communism and state enterprises could not play an
important part for the growth of economic and social development in the long
run. This should be a good experience for PAT to adapt to the new environment.
In addition, the idea on political philosophy stated that the government should
interfere with the management as little as possible to promote the freedom and
progress in economics and politics and let the market mechanism control and
adapt their functions.
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Chapter 5
Alternatives to BKP and LCP
The methods in privatising state enterprises to be used by the government can range
from liberalisation, commercialisation, corporatisation, sales of assets, public share
offers, joint ventures, concession, auction, build operator transfer (BOT) to management
employee buyout (MEBO). One type of privatisation may be successful to apply in one
country but it could be a disaster in another country as Professor Shuo Ma of World
Maritime University advised. Therefore, some methods to be chosen to apply by the
government are up to the type of state enterprise. In addition, the most suitable method
should also be adaptable to the environment.

5.1 The basic port privatisation alternatives
The possibilities of basic port privatisation can be summarised as follows: ( Pintadit,
1997, p.55)

a) The state or local government of port organisation will lease its facilities and/or
enters into Build, Operate and Transfer (BOT) contracts for private enterprise
management and operations of terminals or larger ports units as well as land areas.
Thus it becomes a landlord.

b) In addition to the above a, the state or local government of port organisation may
turn the important service functions such as dredging, tug boat services, maintenance
of cargo handling equipment etc to private enterprise. Therefore, the port owner
becomes almost exclusively a landlord such as in the Rotterdam Port.
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c) The corporation of the state or local government of port organisation may continue
function as the port operator or may contract for terminal operations and other
services the same as in b. This becomes mainly a landlord. To begin this is that the
government will be the sole shareholder. The corporation may sell shares to public.
This is considered as an opportunity for the government to reduce its share holding
to less than 50%.
d) The state or local government of port organisation sells terminals or entire port to
private operators such as in England.

5.2 The existing port privatisation in Thailand
Port privatisation has been practised for a decade whereas major privatisation
undertaken was as follows:
a) Lease and BOT contracts with private terminal operators in LCP have been made
since 1990.(See Table 15 )
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Table 15 Terminal leased by company and concession period at LCP
Terminal
A2
A4
A5

Company

Concession period

Thai Laem Chabang

1996-2026

Terminal Co., Ltd.

(30years)

Aawthai Warhouse Co.,

1993-2018

Ltd.

(25 years)

Banpu Terminal Co., Ltd.

1996-2021
(25 years)

B1

Thai Laem Chabang
Terminal Co., Ltd.

B2

Evergreen Container
Terminal (Thailand) Co.,

1995-2022
(27 years)
1993-2020
(27 years)

Ltd.
B3
B4

Eastern Sea Laem Chabang

1990-2017

Terminal Co., Ltd.

(27 years)

TIPS Co.,Ltd.

1990-2017
(27 years)

B5

Laem Chabang

1996-2026

International Terminal Co.,

(30 years)

Ltd.
Source: Laem Chabang Port

b) Maintenance of cargo handling equipment, cleaning, design and construction as well
as cars leasing for staff at BKP were managed by private companies.( See Table16)
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Table 16 Cleaning and car leasing by private company in PAT

Topic

Company

Cleaning

Siam Ratchathani Co., Ltd.
To clean port area and building

Car Leasing

- Air-conditioned buses about 20 different
lines from different companies to pick up
and see off PAT employee.
This will replace PAT bus.
-

Car for senior management

Private company will provide a car with
car driver to PAT whereas PAT will pay
10,000 baht a car monthly.
Source: Port Authority of Thailand

c) The lands of BKP are leased to other government agencies, private companies and
individuals. (See Table 17)
Table 17 PAT’s land lessee
Land lessee

Usage

Petroleum Authority of Thailand

Oil storage

Bangkok Mass Transportation Authority

Parking place

Housing Authority

Housing for poor people

Bangkok Metropolitan

Park for public

Private

Commercial building

Individual

Market

Total area

340 acres

Source : Bangkok Port
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d) The larger and small private terminals for dry bulk , general cargo and containers
along the Chao-Pra-ya river and along the coast north of LCP were established.
(See Table 18,19)
Table 18 Private berths along Chao Phra ya river

Private berth

Length of berth

Vessel

Thai Property Terminal Co., Ltd.

150 m.

1

Bangkok Modern Terminal Co., Ltd.

315 m.

2

United Thai Shipping Co., Ltd.

200 m.

1

Siam Land and Sea Service Co., Ltd.

270 m.

1

BDS Terminal Co., Ltd.

150 m.

1

Total capacity

640,000 Teus / year

Source: Bangkok Port

Table 19 Private berth around LCP
Private berth

For

NPC Berth

Chemical goods

TPI berth

Liquid goods

Siam Seaport

General cargo

Sriracha Harbour

General cargo

Source: Laem Chabang Port

e) Map Ta Phut industrial port located in the Rayong province is a port to promote the
industry under the Estate Industrial Authority of Thailand (IEAT). In September
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1992, IEAT awarded a contract to the Thai Prosperity Terminal company to operate
the multi-purpose terminal to serve the shipment of bulk cargo and commodities.
Table 20 Map Ta Phut port facilities
Terminal Facilities
Quay length

330 m.

Quay depth

10.5 m

Berthing depth

10.0 m

Source :Board of Investment

f) SongKhla and Phuket ports under the Harbour Department have been managed and
operated by Chaopraya Terminal International Co.,Ltd. (CTIC) since 1988.
Table 21 Songkhla and Phuket capacity
Songkhla Port

Phuket Port

Capacity (Tons/year)

3 million

3 million

Largest ship (tons)

20,000

20,000

Containers (TEUs)

128,000

32,000

Source: Board of investment

5.3 The Basic alternatives applied to PAT

5.3.1

The continued and extended leasing alternative

The minimum privatisation alternative is the status quo. The leasing and BOT contracts
in LCP and leasing of land outside the customs fence in BKP should be extensive
whereas limited privatisation of other services such as maintenance of operating

47

equipment in BKP should be improved. PAT owned cargo handling equipment in LCP
whereby the private terminal operators will maintain them. Privatisation alternatives
such as terminals in BKP should continue the same as previously practised in LCP.
For LCP, Phase 2 facilities will be leased when the construction has been completed.
The share of private investment for Phase 2 facilities such as quay structure and some
reclamation will be increased when compared with the existing facilities. The lease or
BOT in LCP contract should be continued for the existing and extended facilities. The
terms and conditions of contract should focus on yielding the desirable return on the
government investment in each terminal and in the reasonable share of the facilities for
all terminals such as breakwater, access channel, basin, navigation aids. Besides, all
maintenance cost which terminal contractors have not to be responsible should be
included. The investment designated in Thai Baht should be adjusted for the
appreciation and depreciation of the foreign currency loans which covered a part of
financing. (Babtie, 1997, p.86)
For BKP, it is necessary to attract private operators to lease the container and general
cargo facilities whereas existing facilities should be leased for several terminals. The
financial terms of the contract should aim at yielding the desirable return on the asset
value of each terminal and of the reasonable share of maintenance costs for all facilities
such as bar channel, depth and navigation aids. The leasing of terminal in BKP will lead
to serious human resource problems since there are more than 1,450 staff working in the
Cargo Operation Department and two Mechanical Handling Equipment Divisions.
The land and building leasing between the customs fence and PAT boundary in Bangkok
to private company should be continued and expanded.

It should be done on a

commercial basic whereby the actual land and building values and lease fee charged for
these in the area surrounding the port should be considered.
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If the above suggestions are implemented, PAT will become a landlord and will need
considerable restructuring for this function. However, problems related to leasing of
terminals in BKP may cause PAT to remain the operator of all or some parts of BKP.

5.3.2

An alternative to selling Cargo Handling Equipment, Dredging Equipment and
Tug Boats

In view of cargo handling equipment included in a terminal lease contract, nonreplacement of worn-out or obsolete equipment owned by PAT such as container quay
cranes should be negotiable. This will create the one organisation with full responsibility
for ownership, operation and maintenance of all cargo handling equipment in one
terminal.
Dredging equipment and tugboats should be sold off to the private enterprises. The total
average annual quantity dredged by PAT in recent years was about 4.6 million cu.m. If
an order of magnitude costs 100 baht per cu.m., this would make revenues about 460
million baht. Following the data of nine months in 1996, the total revenue from BKP
tug boats including services rendered to ships calling at private wharfs was about 85
million baht whereas the revenue of that at LCP was about 65 million baht. Thus, the
total revenue from two ports was about 150 million baht. Dredging equipment should be
sold to private companies whereas the dredging maintenance of bar channel should be
done by existing dredging companies with a reasonable cost tariff. Some of the 500
staff in the Marine Department may find employment with the company. Tugboats
should also be sold to private company whereas the tug boat service channel should be
done by existing tug boat companies with a reasonable cost tariff. Some of the 300 staff
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in the Harbour Service Division may find employment with the company. This
alternative will make PAT’s landlord function more declared and therefore need further
restructuring. Major redundancy problems will be limited to dredging, tug boats and
related staff if PAT remains the BKP operator.
Restructuring of PAT will involve the reduction of staff over a period of several years.
Retirement over a number of years should be accomplished whereas rehiring should be
done for essential positions only. Some of the PAT staff working at container terminals,
general cargo division, dredging and tug boat division may find employment from
private terminal operators if terms and conditions would be agreed. The remaining
redundancy of staff should be taken care of by early retirement plans or training for
other jobs; however, this will be a considerable cost for PAT. (PAT, 1997,2)

5.3.3 Corporatisation
The port is converted into a legally and economically independent entity with a board of
directors while the government keeps its equity ownership. (UNCTAD, 1995, p.71)
Corporatisation involves the establishment of several companies such as Bangkok Port
company, Laem Chabang Port company, a dredging company, a tug boat company
including an asset management company for the land outside the customs fence in BKP.
The above companies will be owned by PAT as a state enterprise or holding company. If
PAT remains a state enterprise, it will retain the ownership of the land and other real
estate assets in two ports. If PAT becomes a holding company, it would lease the land
and other real estate assets in two ports from the government. Existing and future lease
and BOT contracts should be administered by two port companies.
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The government will initially own all the shares and remain a majority shareholder or
become a minority shareholder later. When the government considers it is suitable time,
the corporatisation will be listed on the stock exchange and some shares will be sold to
the public. According to the absorptive capacity of the equity market and desire to
optimise revenues, the sale of share should be spread over a long period of time.
The Port of Singapore Authority (PSA) is being privatised under the name of PSA
corporation at the same time as the law requirement is passed. After the corporation has
been established, the government will consider the appropriate time to list it on the stock
exchange and some shares will be sold. However, it has not intended to lease or sell
terminals or other facilities to private enterprises.

5.3.4

Outright sale of PAT assets and businesses

5.3.4.1 General
Privatisation will be achieved completely when PAT’s assets and businesses are sold to
private companies. The above companies will continue port operations as agreed under
the government regulation. This is the way that port privatisation was carried out in the
United Kingdom. If this alternative is implemented, PAT will become the government
agency to be responsible for regulation of all major ports in Thailand. However, the
implementation of this alternative is quite complicated owing to the existing lease and
BOT contract. Relocation of the slum dwellers in the BKP area as well as that of the
fishing village in the LCP area will be taken an unpredictable number of years.
(Bangkok Post, 1995, p.5)
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5.3.4.2 Problems is related to sales or long term leasing of the PAT terminal and land
and the change from lease or BOT contract to sale
5.3.4.2.1 General
According to the laws, PAT cannot sell the land or fixed facilities. In addition, some
parts of land of PAT were expropriated from private owners so as to be used by PAT as
the public port. The government is unlikely to consider sales of land and fixed facilities
as a politically acceptable alternative. Long term leasing about 99 years is considered to
be equivalent to sale but is not possible without legislation.
A number of terminal facilities at LCP as well as that at BKP are leased to private
enterprises. Many leases are long term and will expire in the distant future. The
problems related to possible sale of assets under the lease or BOT contract are discussed.

Existing lease and BOT contracts for container Terminals at LCP
PAT has leased terminals to private operators since December 1990. The first two
leases for Terminal B3 and B4 were originally for 12 years but the bidding was scrapped
because the proposal that a lessee should give PAT additional profit if the actual cargo
volume surpassed the minimum volume expected was not attractive. PAT again called
for a bid and leases were extended in November 1996 to 2020. A BOT contract for
Terminal B5 was made for 30 years in April 1996. Thus, it will expire in 2026. The
operator has financed the quay structure, completion of reclamation, pavements,
building, utilities as well as cargo handling equipment. (LCP, 1996, p.2)
Existing lease and BOT contracts for other Terminals and for Shipyard Facility at LCP
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The first contract for a shipyard facility was made in December 1990 and will expire in
2020. A BOT contract for a bulk sugar and molasses terminal, A4, was entered into in
March 1993 and will expire in 2028. A lease contract for a coal terminal, A5, was
entered into in April 1996 and will expire in 2021. A BOT contract for a multi purpose
terminal, A2, was entered into in September 1996 and will expire in 2026.
(LCP, 1996, p.3)
Existing lease contracts for land between the Customs fence and port boundary at BKP
Land areas are leased to other government agencies for 1-3 years except that 8 rai were
leased to Bangkok Metropolitan Authority for 20 years and will expire in the 2013, 140
rai were leased to the National Housing Authority for 20-30 years and will expire in the
years 2005, 2006 and 2010 respectively. However, most land areas are used by the
Petroleum Authority of Thailand (PTT), the Customs Department, Ministry of Industry
without the limitation of time. Of all these, only PTT pays a lease fee to PAT. (PAT’s
Annual Report,1996, p.56)
The lease to significant private companies is that the Fuel Pipeline Co., Ltd., leased 6 rai
of land for 30 years and will expire in 2022 and a lease of 14 rai of land for the building
for 20 years which will expire in 2012.
If PAT has attempted to sell a lease or BOT contract terminal to a third party, the present
operators may disagree to give up their businesses. Excess compensation may be used if
PAT is not willing to pay. Negotiation to come to an end will take many years.
However, the terminal for sale should be offered to the present operators but they may
not be interested in purchasing the terminal because it is not their long range planning to
go beyond the lease period.

Besides, the present operators will expect to get
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compensation to terminate the lease from PAT rather than to take risks of ownership.
Sale of facilities which is larger than the terminals to a third party or the present operator
will be complicated and time consuming because this will involve two or more operators
who disagree with the terms and conditions.
Sale of terminals in BKP
Terminals in BKP for containers and general cargo should be sold separately. However,
the same problems as the sale of terminals in LCP will happen. In addition, the serious
problems for the third party are the limitation of container throughput about 1 million
TEUs through BKP led to the decline of throughput and the diversion of container and
general cargo to LCP. A private terminal along the river near BKP and that along the
coast north of LCP to handle container or general cargo, dry or liquid bulk will be a
better alternative for private enterprise. The license issued by the Office of Maritime
Promotion Commission (OMPC) is valid for 15 years and it can be renewable. This is a
significant advantage when compared with a longer period of mandatory terminal
operations.
Sales of Land outside the Customs Fence in BKP
When the land lease for short and long term expires, the requirement for land for port
related purpose will not increase. The land should be sold to the highest bidders
following the market value and the actual land price in adjacent areas should be
compared.
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5.4 Advantages and disadvantages of the different alternatives
Six things to be considered for these are as follows. (Babtie, 1997, p.99)
1) Efficiency of operations, quality and/or cost of services provided
2) Financial return to and/ or reduce investment requirement for the government
3) Government privatisation policy
4) Legal matters
5) Human resource problems
6) Constraints owing to existing lease or BOT contracts

5.5 The choice between alternatives
5.5.1

First Alternative

The privatisation in BKP and LCP will continue as currently practised. Therefore, law
matters, human resource problems and existing lease and BOT contracts will not have
an impact whereas the equipment maintenance or other activities at BKP will be
managed by the private sector. This may cause staff redundancy problems at BKP.
Following this alternative, LCP will be the only primary activity to extent to comply
with the government policy.
In view of the efficiency and finance involved by the government, existing dredging and
tugboat services are not satisfactory because the utilisation of tugboats is about 50% as
the income from tugboats decreased led to losses. In addition, the cost of dredging by
PAT is higher than that by private companies and payback is not low when comparing
the investment with income. The land leasing outside the Customs fence is also not
satisfactory for both PAT and the government since it does not create much income and
follows a commercial basis. The summary of this alternative can be seen in Table 22.
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Table 22 the advantage and disadvantage of alternative 1.
Topic

BKP

LCP

Efficiency and /or

It may be acceptable

cost of services

since some activities

since

are

terminals

operated

by

private companies.

It will be improved
most

of
are

operated by private
companies

Finance return to and

It

is

/or reduce investment

since

by government

changed.

Government policy

It

is

insignificant

It

nothing

since

insignificant
nothing

is

changed-

against

government
to

is

is

the

policy

privatise

state

It may be acceptable
since

most

terminals

of
are

enterprise following

operated by private

IMF and world bank

companies.

advice.
Legal matters
Human resource

There is nothing

There

is

nothing

concerning law

concerning law

There

There

is

nothing

is

nothing

affects the security

affects the security

of PAT employee

of PAT employee

work

work

Topic

BKP

LCP

Existing lease and

There

BOT contract

affect the existing

affect the existing

contract

contract

is

nothing
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There

is

nothing

5.5.2

Second Alternative

In addition to alternative 1, terminals in BKP will be leased by private companies
whereas tugboat and dredging services are also managed by the private sector.
Following this alternative, the efficiency requirements for four primary activities will be
satisfied.
In view of finance involved by the government, BKP and LCP will not be improved
significantly because the different ways of privatisation to dredging and tugboat
services will be likely to have different effects.
In regard to compliance with the government policy, BKP and LCP have partially
fulfilled the government requirements. However, divestiture of dredging and tugboats
services will satisfy the government requirements. Legal matters will be applicable to
these two activities and will involve minor problems. On the contrary, human resource
problems would be major problems for BKP to consider.
PAT can not be classified as a group one status with state ownership less than 50% by
this alternative. The sole reduction of state ownership will result from the divestiture of
dredging and tugboat services. The summary of this alternative can be seen in Table 23.
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The table 23 the advantage and disadvantage of alternative 2.
Topic

BKP

LCP

Efficiency and /or

It will be improved

It will be improved

cost of services

since

since

terminal,

dredging

and

terminal,

dredging

and

tugboat services are

tugboat services are

operated by private

operated by private

companies

companies

Finance return to and

It

/or reduce investment

improved

improved

by government

significantly

significantly

because of different

because of different

effect of dredging

effect of dredging

and tugboat

and tugboat

It will fulfil the

It will fulfil the government

government

requirement partially

Government policy

will

not

be

It

will

not

be

requirement
partially
Legal matters

There is nothing concerning There
law

Human resource

It

is

nothing

concerning law
creates

major

It is not serious

problems to PAT

since the number of

employees working

PAT employee at

at

LCP is about 250

dredging

tugboat section.

and

and

a

employee
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few

Pat

working

at

dredging

and

tugboat sections.
Topic

BKP

Existing lease and

There

BOT contract

affects the existing

affects the existing

contract.

contract.

5.5.3

LCP
is

nothing

There

is

nothing

Third Alternative

PAT has continued being a state enterprise whereas four or five companies will be
established and owned by PAT. The share will be sold to the public later. The asset
management company for PAT should not be established if PAT will make a contract
about land lease services with one or more private real estate management companies.
PAT remains the owner of land whereas private companies will manage and operate the
terminals both at BKP and LCP.
In view of the efficiency requirement, this alternative will be satisfactory for all the
primary activities and finance involved by the government and it is considered
favourable.
This alternative will be in line with the government policy and will classify PAT as a
group one status with state ownership less than 50%.
In view of legal matters related to the establishment of companies in two ports, they are
not so serious because it is up to the government’s interpretation. The PAT Act can be
amended to enable PAT to own public companies.
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In regard to human resources, this alternative would pose major problems at BKP to
those working on dredging and tug boat services. Contractual problems for existing
lease and BOT arrangements will be transferred to new entities. The summary of this
alternative can be seen in Table 24.
Table 24 the advantage and disadvantage of alternative 3.
Topic

BKP

LCP

Efficiency and /or

It will be improved

It will be improved

cost of services

since

since

terminal

managed

is
and

terminal

managed

is
and

operated by private

operated by private

companies.

companies.

Finance return to and

It will be favourable

It will be favourable

/or reduce investment

since the efficiency

since the efficiency

by government

requirement

requirement

Government policy

Legal matters

is

is

satisfied

satisfied

It is in accordance

It is in accordance

with the government

with the government

policy as PAT with

policy as PAT with

state ownership less

state ownership less

than 50%

than 50%

It is difficult and

It is difficult and time

time consuming for

consuming for PAT to own

PAT to own public

public company

company
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Human resource

It

creates

major

It is not serious

problems to PAT

since the number of

employees working

PAT employee at

at

LCP is about 250

terminal,

dredging

and

tugboat section.

and

a

employee
at

few

Pat

working

dredging

and

tugboat sections.
Existing lease and

It

may

create

BOT contract

problem to transfer

It may create problem to
transfer it to new entities

it to new entities

5.5.4 Fourth Alternative
PAT will be changed to be a holding company for port companies and service
companies whereby related companies will be set up. The land will be transferred back
to the government and PAT will lease it from the government later.
In view of efficiency, financing involved by the government and government policy,
compared with alternative 3, there is not too much difference except that alternative 4
will be in line with the government policy and classify PAT as a group one status with
state ownership less than 50%.
In view of legal matters, much time will be consumed to establish the holding
companies and to transfer PAT land areas to the government and to lease them back.
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In regard to human resources, this alternative would pose major problems at BKP to
those working on dredging and tug boat services.
The problems related to existing lease and BOT contracts will remain the same as in
alternative 3. The summary of this alternative can be seen in Table 25.
Table 25 the advantage and disadvantage of alternative 4.
Topic

BKP

LCP

Efficiency and /or

It will be improved

It will be improved

cost of services

since

since

terminal

managed

is
and

terminal

managed

is
and

operated by private

operated by private

companies.

companies.

Finance return to and

It will be favourable

It will be favourable

/or reduce investment

since the efficiency

since the efficiency

by government

requirement

requirement

Government policy

Legal matters

is

is

satisfied

satisfied

It is in accordance

It is in accordance

with the government

with the government

policy as PAT with

policy as PAT with

state ownership less

state ownership less

than 50%

than 50%

It is difficult and

It is difficult and

time consuming for

time consuming for

PAT

establish

PAT

company

holding

to

holding
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to

establish
company

Human resource

and transfer land to

and transfer land to

the government and

the government and

lease it back

lease it back

It

creates

major

It is not serious

problems to PAT

since the number of

employees working

PAT employee at

at

LCP is about 250

terminal,

dredging

and

tugboat section.

and

a

employee
at

few

Pat

working

dredging

and

tugboat sections.
Existing lease and

It

may

create

It

may

create

BOT contract

problem to transfer

problem to transfer

it to new entities

it to new entities

5.5.5 Fifth Alternative
Following this alternative, PAT assets and businesses will be sold to the private
sector.
With regard to efficiency and financing involved by the government, it will not fully
conform to the government policy because sale of PAT land to private enterprises will
not be accepted by any present or envisaged future government and furthermore existing
laws prohibits to do so. According to the law, leasing of land will last only for 40 years.
In addition, land under existing lease and BOT contracts have to be managed before
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sale. It may not be easy to do this because contracts will expire about 20-30 years after
1997.
In view of human resource problems, this alternative will be worse than any other
alternatives and be aggravated because it will take considerable time to find appropriate
solutions. The summary of this alternative can be seen in Table 26.
Table 26 the advantage and disadvantage of alternative 5.
Topic

BKP

LCP

Efficiency and /or

It will be improved

It will be improved

cost of services

because everything

because everything

will be operated by

will be operated by

private companies

private companies

Finance return to and

It will be favourable

It will be favourable

/or reduce investment

since the efficiency

since the efficiency

by government

requirement

requirement

is

satisfied
Government policy

It

Legal matters

satisfied

follows

government

is

the
policy

It

follows

government

the
policy

but sale of land to

but sale of land to

private is problem

private is problem

following the laws

following the laws

It is difficult and

It is difficult and

time consuming for

time consuming for

PAT to sale of land

PAT to sale of land

64

Human resource

Following the laws

Following the laws

It

major

It is not serious

problems to 6,000

since the number of

PAT

employees

PAT employee at

because

some

LCP is about 250.

creates

them

will

of
be

employed by private
company
the

rest

whereas
will

be

unemployed
Existing lease and

It creates

major

It

creates

BOT contract

problem

since

problem

major
since

existing contract has

existing contract has

not expired

not expired.

65

Chapter 6
The suitable solution
6.1 Alternative Selection
Following the government policy, alternative 1 and 2 should be ignored because
PAT will not be classified as a group one status with state ownership less than
50%. Similarly, alternative 5 should be eliminated because it will create serious
human resource problems involving the sale of PAT land to the private sector.
Such sale of land may likely be politically and legally unacceptable.
Alternative 3 and 4 can be line with the government policy whereby PAT will be
classified as a group one status with state ownership less than 50%.
Alternative 3 will not be an obstacle for the adoption to alternative 4 at the next
step because PAT remains state enterprise and the employees will not be
concerned about job security. In the short and medium terms, PAT employees
remain with PAT and work for BKP and LCP companies. In addition, alternative
3 is the most suitable course of action for PAT because the plan will be
developed to cope with rapid changes. Furthermore, the time for consideration
about the role of PAT in the future will be given before the final status will be
decided.
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6.2 The rationale for this alternative
PAT will remain a state enterprise whereby a statutory, regulatory, planning and
development role including its ownership of land in the two ports will be
retained. All necessary land areas for port operations will be leased to the newly
established port companies except when the lease of land and BOT contracts
already exist. Regarding commercial advantages, PAT should lease all the land in
its care that is no longer required for port operational needs. All available
equipment will be also leased or sold to the newly established port companies.
Existing and future leases including BOT contracts should be managed by PAT
or transferred to BKP and LCP companies.
All shares in the newly established port companies will initially be held by PAT
or the Ministry of Finance (MOF). Some or all of the shares may be sold to
public investors. In view of tactics, the sales of a substantial minority should be
given to a strategic partner with good technical and managerial leadership. The
government should hold a minority share so as to protect the national interests
and give assurance to investors. The commercial activities should be separated
from statutory and regulatory functions.
BKP and LCP companies will be established with freely standing limited public
companies. Each port will have independent boards with memorandum of
agreement and share register. A planning and development role for the two ports
will be retained by PAT to ensure the ongoing development and protect the
national interests.
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PAT as a part of the regulatory role will ensure that the abuse of user charges will
not occur whereby monopoly positions are prevented. The mechanism of this
can be done by setting a ceiling tariff or an appealing procedure to increase user
charges.
Owing to traffic pattern changes, BKP companies will set up the business
division to run the business efficiently and to allow the rationalisation of
operations. The project to develop the infrastructure and superstructure in the
port area will be financed by the port companies or their tenants following the
BOT arrangement.
Tugboat services will be arranged by the port company on a renewable contract
basis. This may be either from a newly privatised tugboat company or an existing
tug boat company. Dredging services will be arranged by the port company on a
renewable contract basis. This may be either from a newly privatised dredging
company or an existing dredging contractor.
The boards of directors were filled with retired military leaders, high-ranking
bureaucrats, and politicians who used their position to obtain jobs for relatives
and friends. (See Table 27) PAT staff members will be nominated as members of
the board of the newly formed port companies. The selection of board members
will be up to their ability to provide the sound judgement or decision related to
the company business. Members of the board from PAT staff should play an
important role in the legal and commercial interest of the new company but they
should not control the company business in the name of the government.
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Table 27 Board of Commissioners and their position
Chairman

Deputy Permanent Secretary (retired), Ministry of
Transport and Communication

Commissioner

Deputy Chief of Join Staff, Supreme Commander
Headquarter (one year left for retirement)

Commissioner

Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Commerce

Commissioner

Permanent

Secretary,

Bangkok

Metropolitan

Administration
Commissioner

Director General, Harbour Department

Commissioner

Deputy Director General, Customs Department

Commissioner

Assistant Director General , Royal Thai police

Commissioner

Assistant Director General , Royal Thai police

Commissioner

Secretary General, Thai National Shipper’s council

Commissioner

Managing Director, Private company

Commissioner

Director General, PAT.

Source. PAT Annual Report 1997

6.3 Future role of PAT and role of its subsidiaries
6.3.1 The future role of PAT
After the two port companies including dredging and tugboat companies are
established, the role of PAT will be changed. As far as PAT remains a state
enterprise and owns 51-100 % of the share in the subsidiaries, PAT remains the
regulatory agency for the two ports until the national regulatory commission will
be established.
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PAT remains the owner of the port land areas and the landlord for the terminal
under lease and BOT contracts in LCP, the leased land area outside the customs
fence in BKP and the future terminal under lease or BOT contracts in both ports.
However, administration of the lease and BOT contracts should be turned to the
two port subsidiaries while the management of the non-operational assets such as
land in BKP should remain with PAT.
PAT should take care of the planning and development function for the two ports
until the agency of the national port planning comes into operation.
The other roles of PAT are about audit and inspection related to subsidiaries,
public relations and general administration including promotion of the use of port
facilities.
Before PAT becomes a holding company and owns less than 51% of the shares in
the subsidiaries, the regulatory role should relinquish to decrease the conflict of
interest between its commercial interests and the enforcement of port regulations.
6.3.2 The roles of the subsidiaries
6.3.2.1 Laem Chabang Port Company
Following the important role of the LCP company, the day-to-day administration
of the lease and BOT contracts for present and future private terminals should be
done.
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To carry out traffic control as well as administration maintenance of the
breakwater, the access channel, the basins, navigation aids and other facilities
which are not maintained by the terminal operators should continue.
The contract for the requirement of dredging maintenance with dredging
subsidiary and other private enterprises for other types of required maintenance
or renovation should be done and negotiated.
6.3.2.2 Bangkok Port Company
Following the important role of the BKP company, it should manage and operate
both the container and general cargo terminals. When private terminals have
come into existence under lease or BOT contracts, the BKP company should
carry out the day-to-day administration of such contracts. In other words, the
BKP company has the same role as the LCP company but there is no breakwater
to maintain at BKP.
6.3.2.3 Dredging company
The dredging company will carry out all maintenance dredging when the
dredging of access channels and the basin along the quays of two ports is
required. The volume unit charge for the dredging will be based on cost and
negotiable up to a period of time.
Minor repair and preventive maintenance of its own equipment can be carried out
whereas major repairs should be contracted out to local shipyards.
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6.3.2.4 Tug Boat Services Company
The tug boat service company will provide its services when there are
requirements from the ships calling at port. The charge for the services will be
based on cost and negotiable up to a period of time. However, the ship operator
should pay the charge directly to the tugboat company. Other commercial
activities such as towage can also be done.
Minor repair and preventive maintenance of its own equipment can be carried out
whereas major repairs should be contracted out to local shipyards.
6.4 Major Concerns of Alternative 3
Following the legal point of view, alternative 3 should be selected because it
accommodates most of the requirements of PAT privatisation.

The legal

obstacles to implement PAT’s privatisation plan under alternative 3 can be
overcome without the fear of uncontrollable outcome. This is because fewer
people and agencies are involved in this alternative than alternative 4 whereby
PAT becomes a limited company.

However, up-to-date events such as the

announcement of the Corporatisation Bill of the government should be
considered.
6.4.1 Main Legal concerns
6.4.1.1 Authority to establish subsidiaries
Following the PAT Act, PAT is not authorised to do what is not described in the
Act including the establishment of a subsidiary. Therefore, it is suggested that
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the PAT Act should be revised so that subsidiary will be allowed to be
established. However, it will take a great deal of time because the amendments
must be enacted by the Parliament. In addition, people and related offices such as
the Harbour Department, the Ministry of Transport and Communications
(MOTC), the Office of Maritime Promotion Commission (OMPC), the National
Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB) and the Judicial Council
should agree with the above amendments. Without the political support, the
amendments will not be achieved. The goal therefore is that it should be raised to
the Minister of Transport and Communications as a policy maker.
6.4.1.2 Land ownership and transfer
The PAT land areas are one of the problems for privatisation because all of them
were acquired by expropriation. The existing land cannot be transferred to PAT
subsidiaries. PAT as a holding entity will collect the rent from its subsidiaries.
6.4.1.3 Control subsidiaries
The intervention from politicians should not happen at the holding title level. The
control of subsidiaries should be made as follows:
a) The contractual relationship between subsidiaries and PAT will be set up.
b) PAT’s own personnel will be nominated to the Board of Directors to control
subsidiaries.
c) PAT’s personnel will work within the subsidiaries and report directly to the
Director General of PAT
d) The combination of a,b and c.

73

6.4.1.4 Legal status of subsidiaries
If PAT holds a share more than 50% of a subsidiary, PAT remains a state
enterprise. It is recommended that PAT’s subsidiaries be a state enterprise in the
short term whereas PAT’s subsidiaries be a non state enterprise in the long term.
6.4.1.5 Privileges and immunities under the PAT Act
As long as PAT’s subsidiaries are state enterprises, they have to comply with
state enterprise law and other regulations of the government. However, PAT’s
subsidiaries cannot enjoy any privileges and immunities given to PAT because
the above privileges and immunities can not be transferred to PAT’s
subsidiaries.
6.4.1.6 Public Service obligation
Following the PAT Act, public welfare should be considered before the profit
motive will be taken. The establishment of subsidiaries to operate port facilities
means that the profit motive will be put into a certain part of PAT operation.
Therefore, the profit motive will bring about the restructure of PAT’s
organisation and also affect the changes of the government policy.

Public

welfare can also be achieved through competition because the participation of the
private sector reserved for the government is beneficial whereas the system to
accommodate change must also be in place.
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6.4.1.7 Competition and sectional policy
PAT employees are subject to the State Enterprise Officers Relation Act. This
act guarantees both job security and standardised condition of work. Personnel
of PAT’s subsidiaries will not enjoy this because the immunities of the above
Act can not be transferred to PAT’s subsidiaries. If PAT is corporatised and
becomes a private company under the Civil and Commercial Code (CCC) or a
public company under the Public Company Act, the employees will be governed
by the Labour Relations Act. However, the change of employment condition
can lead to legal problems. PAT cannot force its employees to retire from PAT
and apply for jobs in the subsidiaries because it is against their wills. It may be
treated as the termination of employment. The considerable payment will be
borne to PAT if employment is terminated without any fault. (See Table 28) The
consultation about this should be sought from the Ministry of Labour and
Juridical Council.
Table 28 compensation for early retirement both BKP and LCP
Compensation for early retirement program
BKP

LCP

207,369,840 baht

4,268,020 baht

Source. PAT Annual Report 1997

6.4.2 Enactment of a Corportisation Bill
A Corporatisation Bill, the most urgent with highest priority, will be submitted
to Parliament by the government and it should have been the law on March
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1998. This Bill will facilitate the PAT privatisation process whereby many
useful provisions will be used to eliminate legal barriers to privatisation. The
issues are as follows:
6.4.2.1 Land ownership
Following the Corporatisation Bill, the land will be transferred to newly
corporatised entities. PAT’s expropriated land may be transferred; although, the
use of expropriated land with commercial interest is illegal. The legal advice on
this issue should be given by the Juridical Council.
6.4.2.2 Land transferred to the government
If PAT is corporatised, the expropriated land will be transferred to the
government. It will not lead to legal problems as long as the land is still used for
the purpose. A corporatised PAT will have to pay the rent whereas the right of
PAT over the land, its usage and land control must be agreed before
corporatisation.
6.4.2.3 Revocation of the PAT Act
Following the Corporatisation Bill, after the transformation process of an
existing state enterprise is completed and becomes a private company under the
Civil and Commercial Code (CCC) or a public company under the Public
Company Act, the establishment law should be revoked. These instruments
should be drafted before the transformation process will be completed.
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6.4.2.4 Regulatory power transfer
PAT’s status will be changed when it becomes a private company. Following the
Corporatisation Bill, the Ministry of Transport and Communications (MOTC) as
a supervised state enterprise will be a regulator. PAT’s regulatory power will be
transferred to MOTC. The document of policy such as national port strategy,
organisation arrangement, and legal framework to ensure fair and free
competition including development plan should be presented to MOTC
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Chapter 7
Conclusion and Recommendation
7.1 Conclusion
Like other state enterprises, PAT was used at some stage in the past to accelerate the rate
of economic growth. Many goals were set for state enterprises but their performances
had been dismal. Many state enterprises had huge losses whereas huge budget was
required. Such huge budgetary led to the piling up of huge debts and constituted a major
fiscal burden. Thailand’s policy for port development is to improve the efficiency of port
operations by privatising existing ports and a newly built port namely LCP and to allow
the private enterprises to compete with ports run by the government.
The ultimate idea behind the privatisation of ports is to reduce the country’s financial
burden through the injection of private capital and to improve the efficiency and
productivity of the whole industry. This move is supported and forced by the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank.
Privatisation may be defined as strategy or process to transfer functions, activities,
assets, some or all parts of an organisation controlled by the government from public to
private. The option of port privatisation is up to the appropriate environment of the
port’s circumstances. The flexible level of privatisation policy should be set before each
option will be considered. From the study of privatisation literature and other ports’
experiences, there are five possible alternatives for BKP and LCP. Each alternative has
its advantages and disadvantages up to a point of view and the government policy.
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It is believed that privatisation will improve the efficiency of state enterprises like BKP
and LCP. This is subject to the force of the market. Private enterprises make an effort to
reduce costs and price under competitive conditions. Private investment in port facilities
means that the government’s subsidy and capital spending will be reduced. On the other
hand, the activity of the private enterprise should be monitored by the port authority so
that unfair practices such as discrimination will be avoided.

PAT needs to take

responsibility for acquisition and allocation of property. The sale of property or assets
will be an important issue that labour unions will use to oppose to privatisation. This is
because they fear decreasing benefits and uncertain status of work.
Privatisation in the future should show the benefits not only for the country but also for
the related offices and personnel. If the government can make sure that privatisation will
increase the benefits to related offices and personnel, and reduce the loss, the consent
from labour unions will be easier.
7.2 Recommendation
Privatisation has both positive and negative effects. It may be useful to pay attention to
the following aspects in order to avoid harmful effects which may take place owing to he
expedited expansion of ports. The following aspects should be considered for further
privatisation so that privatisation will be implemented successfully.

79

1. Thai ports which are under the responsibility of different offices such as the Harbour
Department, the Port Authority of Thailand, the Ministry of Finance, and the Office
of Maritime Promotion are classified into various categories. This entails many
complicated shipping procedures to hinder not only efficient operations of ports and
vessels but also any integrated development of ports from the point of view of
national development as a whole. It is suggested that an in-depth study should be
commissioned in order to examine the advisability and practicability of restructuring
the maritime administration. Alternative plans should be made for simplification,
rationalisation or streamline to administrative organisations with possible advantages
and disadvantages as compared with existing organisation.
1. Without the transfer of ownership, the success of newly established port companies
and the efficiency of operations can not be achieved. The organisation will operate
in a commercial and competitive environment therefore the relationship and cooperation with other organisations have to be improved. The implementation of
market policy to attempt to attract the customers is also important.
1. It is considered that private firms are more efficient in running terminals. However,
the efficiency of cargo handling to be pursued and the profitability in management to
be sought may lead to negligence of safety standards in working. The government
and port authority have to strengthen their functions in this point.
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1. The government policy to encourage the participation from foreign capital may be
good for the economy. However, the management should be sought from available
experts whereas the dependence of foreign experts should be one of the alternatives.
1. The operation of newly established port companies will not be successful in financing
at an early stage. As long as the efficiency is concerned, it can not be summarised
that it will be higher if the port is operated by the government. Nevertheless, the
advantage is that the government is guaranteed to receive a certain amount of money.
On the contrary, the government has to pay the compensation in case of
financial loss if the port is managed by the government
6. The case that port is in a monopolistic market position and there is neither direct nor
indirect competitors is an academic point of view. In fact, most ports are facing the
competition from hinterland and shipping lines.
7. Any laws that inhibit capital and labour mobility should be revised to make
privatisation successful and facilitate the full function of the market force.
8. One of the objectives of privatisation is that the market mechanism is the best for
Optimising economic welfare. Market forces will be an important factor to rational
Decisions about resource allocation. This will happen when private enterprises are
Free to take their own decision. The role of the government will be limited to
maintain public order. In other words, to transfer the monopoly of the government
to private companies will not benefit the general public unless this would further

induce management efficiency and productivity of the organisation under a
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competitive market environment.
8. The various strategies to privatisation should be considered before it is implemented.
When a port is privatised, commercial freedom should be assumed in order to respond
To the market needs related to services, prices and quality.
8. Port Privatisation should be used as a tool for economic development more than a
political solution. Moreover, consideration must be given to techniques that have
Been employed in implementing the program towards a new organisation culture to
Date.
11. Without the change in relationship with other transport modes, privatisation of ports
will not be achieved. The port is not the end of the terminal but the land is the final
destination. Therefore, ports will be supported by effective inland accessibility and
transport services.
12. The new framework should be regarded as a first step towards a new port
organisation to contribute to the expectation of the country. There is no central
organisation competency in charge of overall planning and policy making for
national port development as a whole in Thailand. It is suggested that the
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development and improvement plans should be carried out systematically and
supervised by the Central Government in order to draw maximum benefit from such
investment in an important infrastructure.
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Appendix 1
Map of Chao Praya River
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Appendix 2
Map of Bangkok Port
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Appendix 3
Map of Laem Chabang Port
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Appendix 4
Background of Laem Chabang Port (LCP)

1. Physical
Following Annual report of PAT (1997) it stated “Laem Chabang Port (LCP)
covering an area of about 2,506 acres is located in the Sri Racha and Bang
Lamung districts in the Chol Buri province at a distance of about 110 kilometres
from Bangkok. LCP is a deep-sea commercial port.”
According to brochure distributed by Marketing and Pubic Relations Section, Laem
Chabang Port (1997) it stated
Bangkok Port under the Port Authority of Thailand has been Thailand’s
major port for more than 40 years’ and has grown and developed in line
with the country’s economics and social development program. However,
since international trade is booming together with the modernisation of
transport methods and Thailand’s tendency to become an industrial
country, only Bangkok Port accommodating ship of not over 8.2 metres
draught could not cope with these trends . Thus, the construction of a new
deep-sea port is an answer.
Laem Chabang Port is designed to render services to large container
ship and bulk carriers, which cannot be accommodated at Bangkok Port. It
is also an infrastructure for the Eastern Seaboard Development Program,
and for the country’s export promotion.
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Laem Chabang Port will systematically decentralise economic
prosperity out of Bangkok and accelerate rural development according to
the National Economic and Social Development Plan. In addition, it will
promote the private sectors’ role in the business pertaining to the port
itself.

The above three statements published in the promotion book of LCP. show a good
summary of the objectives and prospects of this port. The history of LCP started in
1961 when the Thai government commissioned the Netherlands Engineering
Consultants (NEDECO) to conduct a feasibility study on developing a new deep
sea port. The project’s feasibility study was reviewed and updated from time to
time according to the change in circumstances. In 1982, the government decided
that this port should be developed and opened for operation by 1990. A loan from
the Overseas Economics Co-operation Fund (OECF) of Japan was granted in 1983
to support this project (70% from OECF, 30% from local currency). The
construction of the port started in December 1967.
Finally, this port was opened for operation in 1991. To avoid inefficiency caused
by bureaucratic rules and procedures, the government first decided to invite the
private sector to operate the four container terminals at the first stage. This
however created strong opposition from port labour unions and went as far as a
strike, which obstructed the country’s, export and import traffic. Following an
article on Labour Disputes in the Lloyd’s List (1994), it stated “Port workers have
been blocking the main entrance to Bangkok Port since about 1800 local time,
only the entrance to East Quay is presently accessible. The strike is causing
congestion in the port.“
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Finally, the Cabinet reversed its former decision and allowed only two container
terminals to be operated by private companies. The other two terminals are
operated under the responsibility of PAT. The private sector and the government
in this special case are expected to compare their operations with others in order to
improve their efficiency.
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Table 29 Detail of first phrase
Terminal

Length/Depth

1 Multi-Purpose

400 m. / 14 m.MSL Conventional or container ship of 50,000

Terminal

Capacity
D.W.T.Capacity, Container ~ 0.2 million
TEUs, General Cargo ~ 2.0 million TEUs
million tonnes. Under construction process
scheduled to operate by the year 2001.

3 Container

300 m. each / 14 m. Container ships of 33,000 D.W.T. cargo

Terminals

MSL (a berth box

terminal capacity approximately 0.3 million

of 50 m. wide,

TEUs per year.

1,200 m. long and

Only B5 is 400 m. quaywall, thus its

15 m MSL deep)

capacity is 0.6 million TEUs per year.

1 Coastal

200 m. / 6.5 m.

Domestic ship of 1,000 D.W.T. capacity

Terminal

MSL

0.163 million ton / year

1 Service Boat

100 m. / 6.5

Service boat of 1,000 D.W.T.

Berth

m.MSL

1 Agri-bulk

14 m. MSL

Terminals

Sugar-molasses ship of 40,000 D.W.T.
capacity
0.7 million tons / year

1 General Cargo 14 m. MSL

Vessel ; 70,000 D.W.T. capacity of 4.0

Terminal

million
tons / year

Source: Laem Chabang Port. PAT.
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Under the policy of government, the following operators operate each berth at the
moment .
Table 30 Berth operators
Berth

Operator

B1(Multi-purpose)

PAT

B2(Container)

Evergreen Container Terminal(Thailand) Ltd

B3(Container)

Eastern Sea Laem Chabang Terminal Co.
(ESCO)

B4(Container)

Thai International Port Service (TIPS)

A1(Service)

PAT

A2(Coastal terminal)

PAT

A3(Bulk Terminal)

Eao Thai Warehouse Co.,Ltd

A4(Bulk Terminal)

Universal Coal Co.,Ltd

Source: Laem Chabang Port

The projects in LCP are as follows:
1. 1 Multi-purpose berth (B1). Its capacity for general cargo vessel is 30,000
DWT and that for general cargo and container is about 0.51 million ton per
year. The capacity of this berth for general cargo and container is about
150,000 TEU/year and expected to increase to 200,000 TEU in 1997
2. 3 Container berths (B2,B3,and B4) . These three berths were constructed in
August1991. Their capacity for vessels is 30,000-50,000 DWT and that for
cargo is about 4.5 million ton per year. The capacity of these berths for
containers is about 150,000 TEU/year and increased to 250,000 TEU in 1997.
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-

Container berth (B2) opened for operation on September1,1991 and has
been rented by Evergreen Container Terminal (Thailand) Co., Ltd. for 12
years as of March30,1993

-

Container berth (B3) opened for operation on November1,1991 and has been
rented by Eastern Sea Laem Chabang Terminal Co., Ltd. (ESCO) for 11
years as of Januray1,1995.

-

Container berth (B4) opened for operation on November1,1991 and has been
rented by TIPS Co., Ltd. for 12 years as of January1,1994.

3. 1 coastal and service berths (A1). This berth was completed in November
1991 Its capacity for coastal ships is about 1000 DWT. PAT manages this
berth
4. 2 agricultural product berths (A3,A4)
-

Agricultural product berth (A3) has been rented by Eao-Thai warehouse
Co., Ltd. to export sugar for 25 years as of March17,1993.

-

Agricultural product berth (A4) has been rented by Universal Coal Co.,
Ltd. for loading coal, fertiliser and other agricultural products.

Although the terminal in phase 1 will be totally completed, the construction of new
container Phase 2 is under operation to serve the increasing demand in the future.
The reasons why Phase 2 should be developed are as follows:
1) The volume of Thailand’s total sea transport requirements is increasing.
2) The capacity of Bangkok Port is constrained due to limited berth availability
and congested land transport infrastructure.
3) The suitability of BKK ports for large vessels is limited due to
limitations of navigability. (maximum vessel draft 8.2 m.)
4) The objective of the government to develop LCP Phase 2 is to promote
LCP as the country’s main gate port in order to replace BKK port.
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In order to meet the future cargo demands until by 2018, LCP has set out a master
plan including Phase 2 and Phase 3 developments. Under Phase 2 developments,
six (6) container terminals and a passenger terminal with a total berth length of
4,100 m. are to be constructed until by 2008. Phase 3 development will be
considered for the other 10 years after development of Phase 2.
The six (6) additional container terminals under Phase 2 development will be built
by 2008 in 4 stages. Stage 1 (C.3 terminal) was completed at the end of 1999 and
provided a 500 m. long container terminal with capacity of 600,000 TEUs. This
terminal is designed to accommodate at least one post-panamax vessel and one
feeder vessel at the same time. Upon the completion of Phase 2 development in
2008, LCP annual capacity will be boosted to 5 million TEUs.
Table 31 Details in Phase 2
Phrase

Stage 1

Stage2

Stage3

Stage 4

2000

2002

2006

2008

No. of Terminal

1(C3)

2(C1, C2)

1(D3)

2(D1,D2)

Total Berth

500

1200

500

1200

500x450

500x450

500x450

500x450

Development
Year to be
completed

Length(m)
Size of Terminal

700x450
Source: Laem Chabang Port
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700x450

Mother vessel berthing at LCP in 1996
It is considered that 1996 was the important year of activities in the port of
Thailand because a mother vessel with capacity more than 2,500 TEU berthed by
5 groups at LCP. This led Thailand to be able to export to destination directly and
decrease dependence on feeder vessels which handled cargoes to mother vessels in
Singapore and Hong Kong.
Following the document of LCP phase 2 (1996), it stated
The above 5 groups are as follows:
1. Global Alliance which consists of
- American President Line (APL)
- Orient Overseas Container Line ( OOCL)
- Mitsui O.S.K. Line (MOL)
- Malaysian International Shipping Corporation Berhad
(MISC)
- Nedlloyd Line
The route is Seattle- Vancouver-Tokyo-Nagoya-Kobe-Kaohsiung-LCP and
vessel will berth at B3 weekly. The mother vessel named “MV.Alligator
Pride” with 42,192 DWT and a capacity of 2,850 TEU was berthed at LCP
by Global Alliance on January8,1996.
2. Sea Land and Maersk Line consists of
- Sea Land
- Maersk Line
- Evergreen Line

98

The route is Tacoma-Vancouver-Tokyo-Kobe-Yokohama-Kaohsiung LCP.and vessel will berth at B2 weekly. The mother vessel named
“Sealand Developer” with capacity of 2,784 TEU was berthed at LCP by
Sea Land and Maersk Line on February19,1996.
3. Grand Alliance consists of
- P&O Containers Line (P&O)
- Nippon Yusen Kaisha Shipping Service (NYK)
- Hapag Lloyd -Ngowhock Agency (HPL)
- Neptune Orient Lines ( NOL)
The route is Los Angeles-Vancouver-Keelung-Singapore-LCP and vessels
will berth at B4. The mother vessel named “Large Bay” with a capacity of
3,324 TEU was berthed at LCP by Grand Alliance on June 3,1996.
4. Evergreen Lloyd Trestino consists of
- Evergreen
- Lloyd Trestino
The route is LCP -Hong Kong -Kaohsiung-Keelung-Osaka-TokyoTacoma-Vancouver-Panamacanal-Valencia-Barcelona-Fos-GenoaLaSpezia-Triste-suez canal-Jeddah-Singapore and LCP and vessels
will berth at B2 weekly. The mother vessel named “Evergrade”
with a capacity of 2,728 TEU was berthed at LCP by Evergreen
Llo6yd Trestino on December,1996.
5.Cosco Container Line consists of
- China Ocean Shipping (Group) Co., (COSCO)
- Cosnum Shipping Co.,Ltd.
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The route is LCP-Hong Kong-Yokohama-Long beach-SeattleVancouver-Yakohama-HongKong -LCP and vessel will berth at
B4.
Following the 8th National Social and Economic Development Plan, it aims to
promote the role of LCP as the main port of country to replace BKP. To expand
the capacity of LCP to 2.25 million TEU/year, PAT signed agreement with Pacific
Consultant International Company to make a feasibility study on LCP Phrase II.
The investment for this project is about 43,000 million baht and it is expected to
be completed in 2000.
B) Economic
1) Vessel service
The inauguration of LCP was in January 1991 but there were only 230 calls :
223 cargo vessel calls, 7 passenger vessel calls and 60 container vessel calls. In
1994 The number of container vessels through LCP increased with a growth of
about 14,423.33% when compared with 1993 . Owing to the policy of the
government to limit containers through BKP, the number of containers has
continuously increased to about 44.15% in 1997 when compared with 1996 (see
table 32)
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Table 32 Statistics of containers through LCP 1991-1997
Unit: TEU
Fiscal year

Container vessel

Total

Growth %

Import

Export

1991

59

1

60

-

1992

3,974

4,740

8,714

14423.33

1993

50,183

86,489

136,672

1468.419

1994

153,190

173,189

326,379

138.8046

1995

235,591

253,783

489,374

49.94041

1996

335,296

374,798

710,094

45.10252

1997

483,195

540,476

1,023,671

44.15993

Source: Technical and Planning Department PAT.
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Figure 4 Container through LCP
2) Goods service
The number of goods through LCP has increased from the inauguration on
LCP in 1991. The average number of goods through LCP from 1991-1997 was
about 4.8 million tons yearly. The growth rate in 1997 when compared with that in
1997 was about 44.18%. It is estimated that goods through LCP will continuously
increase owing to the limitation of containers through BKP and the growth of
international trade.
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Table 33 Import and Export goods through LCP 1991-1997

Fiscal year

Import goods

Export goods

Total

Growth %

1991

674,865

6,841

681,706

-

1992

1,230,648

53,998

1,284,646

88.4457523

1993

1,142,721

896,629

2,039,350

58.7480131

1994

1,706,438

2,029,318

3,735,756

83.1836615

1995

2,452,904

3,288,809

5,741,713

53.6961461

1996

3,457,328

4,968,315

8,425,643

46.7444123

1997

4,692,195

7,455,917

12,148,112

44.1802365

Source: Technical and Planning Department PAT.
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Figure 5 Import and Export goods through LCP (1991-1997)

103

Problems of LCP
LCP was inaugurated on January 21,1991. In the first period, a few vessels
berthed since it had operated partially and infrastructures such as railway, road,
telephone still had not been completed. The government policy is to promote LCP
and to limit containers to BKP. The tariff at LCP was decreased to attract port
users but it was not successful because of the following:
1. The lack of economic of scale
Following an article on PAT Solution in Port Development International (1995), it
stated,
Despite having a cheaper tariff, Laem Chabang Port can still work
out expensive for those using it, says Chivamit, with low traffic
levels meaning there are no economies of scale. One of the ways to
reduce overall unit costs is to bring in larger vessels, which will be
calling Laem Chabang Port from 1996.”
2. Unfamiliarity and inconvenience of port users who were used to BKP
3.The transportation cost from LCP to the factory is higher than that from BKP.
4. Infrastructures such as telephone, road and electricity has still not been
completed to serve port users. This in turn led to inconvenient communication.
According an article on Klong Toey to Reduce Traffic in Lloyd’s List (1993), it
stated “The performance of LCP has not been as good as originally expected and
the port has received a great deal of criticism because of poor road and rail
communication”
5. The future of LCP is still uncertain due to the dominance of BKK as Thailand’s
industrial heartland. Following an article on Second Basin at Laem Chabang in
Lloyd’s List (1995) it stated “Shippers and shipping lines may be reluctant to use the
port because it is too far away from their customer’s BKK factories”
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However, LCP has lessened the problems in BKP such as traffic jam, inadequate
capacity to cope with the number of increasing goods owing to the growth of
international trade. Although some obstacles existed in the first period of LCP,
LCP will be an important part to develop the trade of country.
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